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ABSTRACT 
This study aims to investigate the relationship between the audit committee and audit quality on 
financial reporting quality. Specifically, studies on the impact of audit quality and on audit 
committee financial reporting quality in Malaysia have critical implications for Malaysia and this 
suggests to examine the significant effect of Audit Committee on Financial Reporting Quality 
(Earning Management). The study used financial statements of 93 of listed trading companies 
from 2013 to 2015 on Bursa Malaysia. Data from the financial statements were analysed with 
multiple regression analytical technique. Thus, this study investigates impacts of audit quality 
and audit committee financial reporting quality in Malaysia. The results show that the audit 
committee had a significantly and no significantly relationship with financial reporting quality. 
Based on finding audit committee independence, audit committee financial expertise, audit 
committee size is not supported and no significance, just audit committee meeting have a 
supported and significant results.  As the size of audit committee increased, financial reporting 
quality was improved. However, this study reveals that a decreased quality of financial reporting 
may be a result from arisen discretionary accruals. Finally, when Audit Quality is treated as a 
moderator variable, there is no significant moderating impact on the relationship between Audit 
Committee and Financial Reporting (EM-Discretionary Accruals). This indicates that financial 
reporting was prepared according to generally accepted accounting standards. Therefore, 
understanding moderate effect of Audit Quality on Audit Committee and Financial Reporting 
Quality proxy Earnings Management (Discretionary Accruals) as an intervening variable could 
be a valuable future research field to venture. 
 
Keywords: audit committee, audit quality, quality of financial reporting, discretionary accruals, 
earnings management, Bursa Malaysia Listed Companies. 
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ABSTRAK 
Kajian ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji hubungan antara jawatankuasa audit dan kualiti audit ke 
atas kualiti pelaporan kewangan. Secara khusus, kajian mengenai kesan kualiti audit dan 
jawatankuasa audit kualiti pelaporan kewangan di Malaysia mempunyai implikasi penting bagi 
Malaysia dan ini menunjukkan untuk memeriksa kesan ketara Jawatankuasa Audit Kualiti 
Pelaporan Kewangan (Pendapatan Management). Kajian ini menggunakan penyata kewangan 
2013-2015 daripada 93 syarikat pemasaran tersenarai di Bursa Malaysia. Data daripada penyata 
kewangan ini telah dianalisis dengan teknik analisis regresi. Oleh itu, kajian ini menyiasat kesan 
kualiti audit dan jawatankuasa audit ke atas pelaporan kewangan di Malaysia. Keputusan 
menunjukkan bahawa jawatankuasa audit mempunyai hubungan yang pelbagai dengan kualiti 
pelaporan kewangan. Berdasarkan kepada mencari kebebasan jawatankuasa audit, kepakaran 
kewangan jawatankuasa audit, saiz jawatankuasa audit tidak disokong dan tidak penting, hanya 
mesyuarat jawatankuasa audit mendapat keputusan yang disokong dan penting. Kerana saiz 
jawatankuasa audit meningkat, kualiti laporan kewangan telah bertambah baik. Walau 
bagaimanapun, kajian ini mendedahkan bahawa kualiti yang menurun laporan kewangan boleh 
terjadi hasil daripada timbulnya akruan. Akhir sekali, apabila Kualiti Audit dianggap sebagai 
pembolehubah moderator, tidak ada kesan sederhana ke atas hubungan antara Jawatankuasa 
Audit dan Laporan Kewangan (EM-Budi Bicara Akruan). Ini menunjukkan bahawa laporan 
kewangan telah disediakan mengikut piawaian perakaunan yang diterima umum. Oleh itu, 
memahami kesan sederhana Kualiti Audit Jawatankuasa Audit dan Kualiti proksi Pengurusan 
Perolehan Laporan Kewangan (Budi Bicara Akruan) sebagai angkubah campur tangan boleh 
menjadi bidang kajian untuk diceburi pada masa hadapan. 
 
Kata kunci: jawatankuasa audit, kualiti audit, kualiti laporan kewangan, akruan, Syarikat 
pengurusan perolehan, Bursa Malaysia Tersenarai 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Earnings management constitutes a very important aspect of financial reporting, which reflects 
its integrity and quality. It further minimises asymmetry in information as well as agency 
conflicts among management, owners, and the majority and minority shareholders. The issue of 
earnings management has become an important concern of corporate governance as audit 
committees’ (AC) effectiveness is largely assessed by their role in ensuring the quality of 
financial reporting. Although there is a rich body of literature on audit committee and earnings 
management issues in Malaysia, discussions on the relationship between audit quality and 
earnings quality have not been extensively explored but another country already discuss 
regarding this issues (Inaam Zgarni, Khmoussi Hlioui & Fatma Zehri, 2016; Zalewska, 2014; 
Ahmad Hussein Al- Rassas & Kamardin, 2015; Fariza Salim, Mohammad Norfien, Mohamad 
Sohail Tahir, 2016). According to Salleh and Haat (2014), the main aim of the audit committee is 
to achieve the legal responsibilities of the board of directors regarding the credibility and 
objectivity of the financial reports. 
 
1.2 Background of Study 
The financial report should be on time, transparent and present financial information objectively 
and impartially. It is a primary tool offering insight into the workings of a company and is crucial 
for investment decisions. It should serve as a guide to those interested in investing by detailing 
how a company performs and manages its resources. Behaviour management is thus essentially 
earnings management. Alzoubi (2012) claims that non-capital providers may also benefit from 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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Appendix 1: MCCG (2012) Part C Audit Committee’s Effectiveness 
15.09 Composition of the audit committee 
1. A listed issuer must appoint an audit committee from among its directors who fulfil the 
following requirements: 
a. The audit committee must be composed of not fewer than three members; 
b. All the audit committee members must be non-executive directors, with a majority of them 
being independent directors; and 
c. At least one member of the audit committee - 
i. Must be a member of the Malaysian Institute of Accountants; or 
ii. If he is not a member of the Malaysian Institute of Accountants, he must have at least 
three years’ working experience and - 
aa. He must have passed the examinations specified in Part I of the First Schedule of the 
Accountants Act 1967; or 
bb. He must be a member of one of the associations of accountants specified in Part II of the 
First Schedule of the Accountants Act 1967; or 
iii. Fulfils such other requirements as prescribed or approved by the Exchange. 
2.  A listed issuer must ensure that no alternate director is appointed as a member of the audit 
committee. 
[Cross reference: Practice Note 13] 
15.10 Chairman of the audit committee 
The members of an audit committee must elect a chairperson among themselves who is an 
independent director. 
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Appendix 2:  Models to Detect Earning Management 
Healy’s Model 
Healy (1985) was the first to examine earnings management premises by using what is called 
Healy discretional accrual. Healy found that accrual policy can shift the accounting policies of 
the coming period to the current period under certain conditions. 
Healy’s formula of accrual policies is as follows: 
Tact = NDACt + DACt 
where 
Tact = Total operating accruals in year t, 
NDACt = Non-discretionary accruals in year t, and 
DACt = discretionary accruals in year t 
The second component was not observed with careful accrual, so Healy assumes that 
nondiscretionary accrual is zero. 
DeAngelo’s Model 
In this model, DeAngelo (1986) assumes that non-discretionary accruals follow a random walk 
pattern. It uses accrual changes aggregate of the year t-1 to year t as an optional component. 
Thus, 
EDACit = TACt-1 / TAit-1 
where 
EDACit = Estimated discretionary accruals for firm i in year t, 
TACt-1 = Total accrual companies in year t, 
TAit-1 = Total assets of the company i at the beginning of the year t. 
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Similar to the Healy’s model, a source of measurement error in the model is the omitted 
variables that affect the accruals in the current year. However, this model is expected to reduce 
the measurement error of the Healy model if non-discretionary accruals follow a random walk. 
Jones’ Model 
Jones (1991) uses regression models to estimate the type of discretionary accruals. He applies the 
non-discretionary accruals model estimation by using the regression formula: 
Tacit/Ait-1 = AI1 (1 / Ait-1) + BI1 (DREVit / -Ait 1) + Bi2 (PPEit / Ait-1) + eit 
where 
Tacit = Total Accruals for firm i in year t, 
Ait-1 = Total assets of the company i at the beginning of the year t, 
Changes in the company's revenue DREVit = i from year t-1 to year t, and 
PPEit = Gross property, plant, and equipment for firm i in year t. 
All variables are reduced by first i total assets to adjust heteroscedasticity. Regression is thus 
discretionary accruals: 
EDACit = Tacit/Ait-1-[AI1 (1/Ait-1) +BI1 (DREVit/Ait-1) +Bi2 (PPEit/Ait-1)] 
Where the coefficients used were those expected from the past least squares regression. Sources 
of measurement error in the model are derived from omitted variable is not captured by the sale 
and the level of Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE) such as changes in the credit standing of 
the client. 
Modified Jones’ Model 
Dechow et al. (1995) recommended an amended version of the model that supports a reduction 
or changes in receivables from revenue to account for the manipulation of non-cash income 
during the period. In a previous study testing, the modified Jones model exhibited the highest 
power and specifications. It is one with at least a measurement error when manipulation occurs 
through receivables (non-cash income). 
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EDACit = Tacit/Ait-1-[AI1 (1/Ait-1) +BI1 ((DREVit-Darit)/Ait-1) +Bi2 (PPEit/ Ait-1)] 
where 
EDACit = Estimated discretionary accruals for firm i in year t, 
Tacit = Total Accruals for firm i in year t, 
Ait-1 = Total assets of the company i at the beginning of the year t, 
DREVit = Changes in company earnings i from year t-1 to year t, 
Darit = Changes in receivables i from year t-1 to year t, and 
PPEit = Gross property, plant, and equipment for firm i in year t. 
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Appendix 3: Data List Free/ACFEX LOGFEE DTAC 
The relationship between ACFEX and earnings management is influenced by the level of the 
audit fee. 
Earning = α0 + ACFEX + LOGFEE + (ACFEX * LOGFEE) + ε 
Value Percentage 
-0.8673 -151235 -0.2046 -86.73 -1.5E+07 -20.46 
0 -151235 -0.2119 0 -1.5E+07 -21.19 
0.8673 0.8673 -0.2192 86.73 86.73 -21.92 
-0.8673 0 -0.2455 -86.73 0 -24.55 
0 0 -0.2334 0 0 -23.34 
0.8673 0 -0.2213 86.73 0 -22.13 
-0.8673 310982.4 -0.3298 -86.73 31098237 -32.98 
0 310982.4 -0.2776 0 31098237 -27.76 
0.8673 310982.4 -0.2255 86.73 31098237 -22.55 
 
Based on analysed data from audit committee independence, audit committee financial expertise, 
audit committee meeting and audit committee size, the result shows the relationship between 
audit committee financial expertise and earning management is influenced by the level of the 
audit fee. 
 ACFEX LOGFEE DTAC  
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Appendix 4: List of Companies in the Table (2013-2015) 
NO COMPANY 
1.  AIRASIA BERHAD
2.  AIRASIA X BERHAD 
3.  ALAM MARITIM RESOURCES BERHAD 
4.  ASTRO MALAYSIA HOLDINGS BERHAD 
5.  ATLAN HOLDINGS BHD. 
6.  AXIATA GROUP BERHAD 
7.  BERJAYA CORPORATION BERHAD 
8.  BERJAYA LAND BERHAD 
9.  BERJAYA MEDIA BERHAD 
10.  BERJAYA SPORTS TOTO BERHAD 
11.  BINTAI KINDEN CORPORATION BERHAD 
12.  BINTULU PORT HOLDINGS BERHAD 
13.  BOUSTEAD HOLDINGS BERHAD 
14.  BRAHIM'S HOLDINGS BERHAD 
15.  BUMI ARMADA BERHAD 
16.  CHEETAH HOLDINGS BERHAD 
17.  COMPUGATES HOLDINGS BERHAD 
18.  CYPARK RESOURCES BERHAD 
19.  DAYANG ENTERPRISE HOLDINGS BERHAD 
20.  DELEUM BERHAD 
21.  DKSH HOLDINGS (MALAYSIA) BERHAD 
22.  EDARAN BERHAD 
23.  EDEN INC. BERHAD 
24.  EITA RESOURCES BERHAD 
25.  ENGTEX GROUP BERHAD 
26.  FIAMMA HOLDINGS BERHAD 
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27.  FITTERS DIVERSIFIED BERHAD 
28.  FREIGHT MANAGEMENT HOLDINGS BERHAD 
29.  FRONTKEN CORPORATION BERHAD 
30.  GD EXPRESS CARRIER BERHAD 
31.  GENTING BERHAD 
32.  GEORGE KENT (MALAYSIA) BERHAD 
33.  HAI-O ENTERPRISE BERHAD 
34.  HARRISONS HOLDINGS (MALAYSIA) BERHAD 
35.  IHH HEALTHCARE BERHAD 
36.  IPMUDA BERHAD 
37.  KEJURUTERAAN SAMUDRA TIMUR BERHAD 
38.  KPJ HEALTHCARE BERHAD 
39.  KUB MALAYSIA BERHAD 
40.  KUMPULAN FIMA BERHAD 
41.  KUMPULAN PERANGSANG SELANGOR BERHAD 
42.  MAGNUM BERHAD 
43.  MALAYSIA AIRPORTS HOLDINGS BERHAD 
44.  MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BERHAD 
45.  MAXIS BERHAD 
46.  MBM RESOURCES BHD 
47.  MEDIA PRIMA BERHAD 
48.  MEGA FIRST CORPORATION BERHAD 
49.  MISC BERHAD 
50.  MMC CORPORATION BERHAD 
51.  M-MODE BERHAD 
52.  MULPHA INTERNATIONAL BERHAD 
53.  NAIM INDAH CORPORATION BERHAD 
54.  NATIONWIDE EXPRESS COURIER SERVICES BERHAD 
55.  OCK GROUP BERHAD 
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56.  PANSAR BERHAD 
57.  PANTECH GROUP HOLDINGS BERHAD 
58.  PARKSON HOLDINGS BERHAD 
59.  PBA HOLDINGS BHD 
60.  PDZ HOLDINGS BHD 
61.  PERAK CORPORATION BERHAD 
62.  PERDANA PETROLEUM BERHAD 
63.  PERISAI PETROLEUM TEKNOLOGI BHD 
64.  PETRA ENERGY BERHAD 
65.  PETRONAS DAGANGAN BHD 
66.  PHARMANIAGA BERHAD 
67.  POS MALAYSIA BERHAD 
68.  PRESTARIANG BERHAD 
69.  PROGRESSIVE IMPACT CORPORATION BERHAD 
70.  RELIANCE PACIFIC BERHAD 
71.  SALCON BERHAD
72.  SAPURAKENCANA PETROLEUM BERHAD 
73.  SCOMI ENERGY SERVICES BHD 
74.  SCOMI GROUP BERHAD 
75.  SEE HUP CONSOLIDATED BERHAD 
76.  SEG INTERNATIONAL BHD 
77.  SHIN YANG SHIPPING CORPORATION BERHAD 
78.  SIME DARBY BERHAD 
79.  SUIWAH CORPORATION BERHAD 
80.  SUMATEC RESOURCES BERHAD 
81.  SURIA CAPITAL HOLDINGS BERHAD 
82.  TALIWORKS CORPORATION BERHAD 
83.  TELEKOM MALAYSIA BERHAD 
84.  TENAGA NASIONAL BHD 
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85.  TH HEAVY ENGINEERING BERHAD 
86.  TIONG NAM LOGISTICS HOLDINGS BERHAD 
87.  TMC LIFE SCIENCES BERHAD 
88.  UMS HOLDINGS BERHAD 
89.  UMW OIL & GAS CORPORATION BERHAD 
90.  UNIMECH GROUP BERHAD 
91.  UTUSAN MELAYU (MALAYSIA) BERHAD 
92.  VOIR HOLDINGS BERHAD 
93.  WESTPORTS HOLDINGS BERHAD 
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Article Introduction/ Background Issue Theory/Variable Method Main Finding 
Independent Dependent 
 
The Effect of Board 
Independence on the 
Earnings 
Quality: Evidence 
from Portuguese 
Listed 
Companies 
 
Alves (2014) 
 
 
Agency theory suggests that 
independent outside board 
members may have an 
important monitoring function 
of the financial reporting 
process. As a result, boards 
with more independent 
directors have a tendency for 
increased monitoring and are 
therefore expected to insist on 
better earnings quality. 
 
Examines 
whether board 
independence 
improves 
earnings quality 
by reducing 
earnings 
management in 
Portugal, a 
country with 
significantly 
different 
institutional and 
legal 
characteristics 
from the anglo-
saxon Countries. 
 
 
Board 
Independence 
 
Earning 
Quality: 
Ordinary least 
square (OLS) 
and two stage 
least squares 
(2SLS) 
techniques; 
discretionary 
accruals using 
the modified 
Jones model  
 
Earnings management 
for a sample of 
Portuguese listed 
firms: 
Board independence 
and earnings quality 
on a sample of 33 
Euronext Lisbon non-
financial firms over a 
period of 8 years 
(2003 to 2010), 
 
The findings of this study make the 
following contributions. First, the 
results indicate that, on average, 
independent members improve 
earnings quality by providing 
effective monitoring of earnings 
management in Portuguese listed 
firms. This result is interesting given 
the scrutiny of corporate governance 
mechanisms and the state of the 
financial reporting system. 
 
Audit Committee and 
Earnings 
Management: Pre 
and Post 
MCCG 
 
Salleh, N., & Haat, M. 
(2014). 
 
The purpose of this study is to 
examine the effectiveness of 
audit committee in 
constraining earnings 
management after the revised 
MCCG among listed firms on 
Bursa Malaysia. 
 
 
How audit 
committee 
impacted 
earnings 
management 
before and after 
the revision of 
MCCG in 
2007. 
 
The audit 
committee 
characteristics 
include size, 
independence, 
expertise, 
frequency of 
meetings and 
activity 
disclosure 
 
The 
discretionary 
accrual was 
estimated using 
the 
Modified Jones 
Model (1995) 
which was used 
to proxy for 
earnings 
management. 
 
The sample for this 
study was drawn from 
280 companies listed 
on Bursa 
Malaysia in 2005, 
2006, 2008 and 2009 
 
The empirical results on audit 
committees play an important and 
effective role in reducing earnings 
management after the revision of 
MCCG. After controlling for firm 
size, board size and leverage, the 
study found that audit committee size 
and audit committee that had 
meetings with external auditor 
without the presence of executive 
directors at least twice a year showed 
a significant association with 
earnings management. Overall, these 
findings called for further 
examination into the roles of audit 
committee in mitigating earnings 
management. 
APPENDIX 5: SUMMARY OF STUDY RELATING TO THE MODERATING EFFECT OF AUDIT QUALITY ON AUDIT COMMITTEE AND FINANCIAL 
REPORTING QUALITY IN MALAYSIA. 
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Board of Director 
Characteristics and 
Earnings 
Management in 
Malaysia 
 
Sohail Ahmed. (2014). 
 
This paper seeks to study the 
relation between board of 
director characteristics as a 
corporate governance 
mechanism and earnings 
management in the Malaysian 
scenario. 
 
No doubt the 
advent of joint-
stock companies 
in the industrial 
world is one of 
the biggest 
economic 
Developments 
and probably the 
most important 
factor of 
industrial 
development. 
 
Board of 
directors’ 
characteristics 
includes number 
of 
meetings, 
existence of 
outside directors, 
financial 
expertise and 
separation of the 
roles of chair and 
CEO 
 
Earnings 
management is 
measured by 
discretionary 
accruals and for 
estimating 
Discretionary 
accruals, 
Modified Jones 
Model is used. 
 
 
Cross-sectional and 
pooled data of 71 
companies listed 
In bursa Malaysia 
from 2001 to 2005 
 
Multiple linear 
Regressions 
 
The results demonstrate that 
financial expertise are positively 
related to earnings management in 
the Malaysian scenario. 
 
Audit Committee 
Composition and 
Auditor Reporting: A 
Malaysian Case.  
 
Ali. R, Shuhidan. S. 
H, Adnan. N. L (2015) 
 
This study is conducted to 
examine the relationship 
between the composition of 
financially distressed firm's 
audit committees and the 
likelihood of receiving going-
concern report in Malaysian 
context by examining 
published information for the 
year 2002 
 
In the wake of 
corporate 
failures 
following 
economic crisis, 
the role of audit 
committees as 
corporate 
governance 
mechanism 
has become more 
important to 
regulators, the 
accounting 
profession and 
the business 
community 
 
Audit Committee 
Composition 
 
Auditor 
Reporting 
Behaviour 
 
The sample of the 
study involves public 
companies listed on 
Bursa Malaysia which 
are classified as PN4 
companies for the 
year 2002. 
The primary sample 
of this study contains 
97 PN4 status 
companies listed on 
Bursa. 
 
 
Consistent with [13] it is found that 
the lower the percentage of 
Affiliated directors on audit 
committee, the higher the tendency 
of receiving a going concern report. 
However, based on 95 percent 
confidence level, the relationship 
exist is not significant. The result of 
the study however inconsistent with 
[51] which found positive 
relationship between percentage of 
affiliated directors on audit 
committee and the tendency of 
receiving going concern report. It is 
This finding can imply that in the 
Malaysian environment, the attitude 
of affiliated directors is very positive 
and the Degree of professionalism 
among external auditors is very high 
that they could not easily influenced 
by the pressure given by affiliated 
directors in the audit committee also 
found in the study that majority of 
the company fulfilled the 
requirement to have at least three 
members in an audit committee or 
more. Future research to utilize latest 
data and using [28] financial 
condition index to recognize the 
distressed companies. 
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Challenges of 
corporate 
governance: 
Twenty years after 
Cadbury, ten years 
after Sarbanes-Oxley 
 
Zalewska, A. (2014). 
 
This paper sets the 
background to the Special 
Issue of the Journal of 
Empirical Finance on 
Challenges of Corporate 
Governance. It identifies the 
alternative approaches that 
can be taken to solve agency 
problems stemming from 
asymmetries of information: 
(i) ex-post monitoring through 
audit and information 
provision, (ii) ex-ante 
monitoring through boards, 
and (iii) incentivisation 
through the alignment of 
managerial incentives with 
shareholders. 
 
 
It discusses how 
the UK and the 
US have 
responded to 
corporate 
failures and 
relates the 
Development of 
regulation in 
these countries to 
the three 
alternative 
approaches. 
 
Corporate 
Governance 
 
Audit 
Committee 
 
Annual Report 
 
This is achieved through an 
imposition of ‘strict’ independence 
of non-executive directors, creation 
of various committees consisting 
entirely of non-executive directors or 
their majority, having 
a senior non-executive member of a 
board to whom all enquiries can be 
directed, and also 
That non-executive directors are at 
least as numerous as executive ones. 
 
The monitoring is also conducted at 
higher than annual 
Frequency, as boards, unlike annual 
reports, meet several times a year. In 
these conditions 
Auditing is another supporting 
mechanism, rather than the main 
mechanism of monitoring. 
 
 
 
Activating the Role of 
Audit Committees and 
Boards of Directors 
in Restricting Earnings 
Management Practices: 
A Perspective of 
Auditors in Jordan 
 
Al Momani, A. M., & 
Obeidat, I. M. (2013). 
 
 
Since the advent of the 
current century, the term of 
corporate governance 
acquired the 
attention of different 
interested groups of people 
such as academics, 
accountants, auditors, 
investors, and creditors. This 
attention was mainly 
attributed to the scandals of 
several 
corporations all around the 
world, especially in US, 
where large corporations such 
as WorldCom and Enron 
collapsed 
 
The study 
objects for 
investigating the 
possibility of 
activating both 
audit committee 
and board of 
Directors for 
restricting the 
practices of 
earnings 
management 
phenomenon. 
 
Audit  
Committees  
and Boards 
 of Directors 
 
Earnings 
Management 
 
Questionnaire had 
been developed and 
self-administered for a 
selected sample 
consists of 123 
auditors working in 
Jordan based on the 
simple random 
sampling method. 
 
Earnings management phenomenon 
can be more restricted through 
activating both of audit committee 
and board of directors, based on the 
corporate governance rules. Earnings 
management practices can be 
reduced more if co-ordination and 
co-operation exists between audit 
committee and board of directors. 
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Audit committee and 
earnings management: 
Pre and post MCCG.. 
 
Salleh, N., & Haat, M. 
(2014). 
 
The purpose of this study is to 
examine the effectiveness of 
audit committee in 
constraining earnings 
management after the revised 
MCCG among listed firms on 
Bursa Malaysia. Specifically, 
the study explores how audit 
committee impacted earnings 
management before and after 
the revision of MCCG in 
2007. 
 
How audit 
committee 
impacted 
earnings 
management 
before and after 
the revision of 
MCCG in 
2007. 
 
The audit 
committee 
characteristics 
include size, 
independence, 
expertise, 
frequency of 
meetings and 
activity disclosure 
 
The 
discretionary 
accrual was 
estimated using 
the Modified 
Jones Model 
(1995) which 
was used to 
proxy for 
earnings 
management. 
 
The sample for this 
study was drawn from 
280 companies listed 
on Bursa 
Malaysia in 2005, 
2006, 2008 and 2009 
 
The discretionary 
accrual was estimated 
using the 
Modified Jones Model 
(1995) which was 
used to proxy for 
earnings management. 
 
The empirical results on audit committees 
play an important and effective role in 
reducing earnings management after the 
revision of MCCG. After controlling for 
firm size, board size and leverage, the 
study found that audit committee size and 
audit committee that had meetings with 
external auditor without the presence of 
executive directors at least twice a year 
showed a significant association with 
earnings management. Overall, these 
findings called for further examination 
into the roles of audit committee in 
mitigating earnings management. 
 
Audit Committee 
Effectiveness, Audit 
Quality and Earning 
Management: An 
Empirical Study of the 
Listed Companies in 
5(2), 155-166. 
 
Soliman, M. M., & 
Ragab, A. A. (2014). 
 
 
The role of audit committees 
and audit quality in ensuring 
the quality of corporate 
financial reporting has come 
under considerable scrutiny 
due to recent high-profile 
earnings management cases in 
the world 
 
The purpose of 
this paper is to 
examine the 
association 
between the 
audit committee 
effectiveness, 
audit quality 
and earnings 
management 
practices of 
more active 50 
Egyptian 
companies 
listed on the 
Egyptian Stock 
Exchange of the 
non-financial 
sector during 
the period 2007-
2010. 
 
Audit committees 
independence 
 
Earning 
Management 
 
The Egyptian 
companies from 
amongst the top 50 
most active-traded 
companies listed in 
the Egyptian Stock 
Exchange over the 
period 2007-2010.  
 
Financial companies; 
e.g. Banks, insurance 
companies, and 
leasing companies; 
were excluded from 
the sample due to the 
different requirements 
of disclosure and 
corporate governance. 
 
 
 
After controlling for size, leverage 
and cash flow from operation 
activities, the results of univariate 
and multivariate analyses indicated 
that audit committees independence; 
experience of audit committee 
members; audit committee meetings; 
and audit quality have significant 
negative association with 
discretionary accruals as a proxy for 
earnings management. On the other 
hand, no significant relationship is 
found between audit committees size 
and the level of discretionary 
accruals. This paper is important 
because it offers useful information 
that is of great value to policy 
makers, academics and other 
stakeholders. 
 
The Effectiveness of 
Monitoring 
Mechanisms for 
Constraining Earnings 
Management: A 
Literature Survey for a 
Conceptual Framework 
 
This paper proposes a 
conceptual framework to 
investigate the role of 
regulatory mechanisms 
concentrating on corporate 
governance and external audit 
for mitigating earnings 
 
The main issue 
involves 
manipulation of 
accounting data 
which lose 
investor 
confidence and 
 
Corporate 
governance 
And external audit 
attributes 
 
Earnings 
management 
 
A Literature Survey 
for a Conceptual 
Framework 
 
Earnings management area has 
gained considerable attention in the 
accounting literature after large 
global corporate and financial 
collapse. Particularly, these scandals 
reduce investor confidence and trust 
in the financial reports. Therefore, 
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Faiza Saleem, Mohd 
Norfian Alifiah, 
Muhammad Sohail 
Tahir (2016) 
 
management. Evidence from 
previous studies supports the 
proposed model. Hence, the 
extant study argues that firms 
with effective monitoring 
mechanisms in the form of 
corporate governance and 
external audit are less likely 
to allow earnings 
management because 
opportunistic earning’s cause 
uncertainty about the 
economic value of a firm 
 
 
 
trust in the 
financial 
reports. 
corporate governance and external 
audit as controlling mechanisms play 
an important role for improving the 
quality of financial reporting 
process. Previous studies suggested 
that boards of directors with smaller 
size, having more independent 
directors and high frequency of 
meetings are effective in their 
monitoring role. Specifically, this 
paper intends to investigate the role 
of monitoring mechanisms by 
proposing a conceptual framework in 
line with previous research. More 
significantly, this study proposed 
prominent factors to overcome the 
earnings management issues. 
 
Directors’ 
Independence, Internal 
Audit 
Function, Ownership 
Concentration and 
Earnings Quality in 
Malaysia 
 
Ahmed Hussein Al-
Rassas, Hasnah 
Kamardin (2015) 
 
Concentration of ownership 
in Malaysian public listed 
companies contributes to 
agency conflict between 
majority and minority 
shareholders. An effective 
monitoring mechanism is 
critical to mitigate this 
conflict 
 
The study aims 
to examine the 
influence of 
board and audit 
committee 
independence, 
internal audit 
function and 
ownership 
concentration 
on earnings 
quality proxies 
by discretionary 
accruals. 
 
Directors’ 
Independence, 
Internal Audit 
Function, 
Ownership 
Concentration 
 
Earnings 
Quality 
 
The sample of the 
study 508 companies 
listed on the Bursa 
Malaysia Main 
Market from 2009 to 
2012. 
 
Two measures of 
discretionary accruals 
are used: Modified 
Jones model (Dechow 
et al., 1995); and 
extended Modified 
Jones Model (Yoon et 
al., 2006). Using OLS 
regression, 
 
However, board of directors’ 
independence and ownership 
concentration are associated with 
lower earnings quality. The finding 
indicates the importance of audit 
committee independence in 
producing quality financial reporting. 
Consistent findings are found for 
most variables in both models. The 
findings of the study have 
implication on the use of 
measurement of discretionary 
accruals in earnings quality studies 
and corporate governance practices 
in Malaysia. 
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